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Random behaviour of cryptographic primitives
Cryptographic primitives should behave like random functions.
Security proofs of many constructions assume random
building blocks
• modes of operation;
• sponge construction...
A distinguishing property may lead to some attacks
e.g., finding the plaintext among a few possibilities.
For iterated constructions
a distinguisher on a round-reduced version may be exploited
for recovering the key (e.g., last-round attacks).
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Algebraic Normal Form
Algebraic Normal Form of f : Fn2 → F2:
unique polynomial representation in F2[x1, . . . , xn]/(x21 − x1, . . . , x
2
n − xn).






u with u ∈ Fn2
Example:



























- -χ - π -
(k1, k2, k3, k4, k5)(k1, k2, k3, k4, k5) (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5)
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5)
y1 = k2k3k4k5 + k2k3k4x5 + k2k3k5x4 + k2k3x4x5 + k2k4k5x3 + k2k4x3x5 + k2k5x3x4
+k2x3x4x5 + k3k4k5x2 + k3k4x2x5 + k3k5x2x4 + k3x2x4x5 + k4k5x2x3 + k4x2x3x5
+k5x2x3x4 + x2x3x4x5 + k2k3k4 + k2k3k5 + k2k3x4 + k2k3x5 + k2k4k5 + k2k4x5
+k2k5x3 + k2k5x4 + k2x3x5 + k2x4x5 + k3k4k5 + k3k4x2 + k3k4x5 + k3k5x4 + k3x2x4
+k3x4x5 + k4k5x2 + k4k5x3 + k4x2x5 + k4x3x5 + k5x2x4 + k5x3x4 + x2x4x5 + x3x4x5
+k1k3 + k1x3 + k2k3 + k2k5 + k2x5 + k3k5 + k3x1 + k3x3 + k3x5 + k4k5
+k4x2 + k4x3 + k4x5 + k5x3 + k5x4 + x1x3 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x3x5 + x4x5
+k2 + k3 + k5 + x2 + x3 + x5
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ANF of a random function
Uniform distribution over all functions:
equivalent to the uniform distribution over all ANFs.
→ each monomial appears with probability 12.
Uniform distribution over all permutations:
open problem.
• all coordinates of a permutation of Fn2 have degree at most (n− 1).
• almost all permutations of Fn2 have degree (n− 1) [Wells 69],




Higher-order differentials [Lai 94]
Differential (derivative) of f w.r.t. α ∈ Fn2 :
Dαf : x 7→ f(x⊕ α)⊕ f(x)
Higher-order differential.
Dα1Dα2 . . . Dαdf(x) =
⊕
v∈〈α1,...,αd〉
f(x⊕ v) := D〈α1,...,αd〉f(x)
degDV f ≤ deg f − dimV
Then, for any subspace V with dimV > deg f
∀a ∈ Fn2 , DV f(a) =
⊕
v∈V
f(a⊕ v) = 0
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Higher-order differential attacks [Knudsen 94]
for all keys, fk has a low degree in x
For any affine subspace a+ V with dimV > degx f⊕
x∈a+V
fk(x) = 0
Distinguisher with data complexity proportionnal to 2degx f
7
Degree of an iterated block cipher
8
PRESENT [Bogdanov et al. 07]
S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S
ski
64 bits
31 rounds (+ a key addition)
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r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
deg 3 9 27 63 63 63 63
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Using the particular form of the Sbox layer
???? ???? ???? ????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
G
S S S S S
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Exercise: find the maximal degree of the following 4-bit function
S













with f(y1, y2, y3, y4) = y1y2.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
S(x) f e b c 6 d 7 8 0 3 9 a 4 2 1 5
S1(x) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
S2(x) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
S3(x) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
S4(x) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
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Exercise: find the maximal degree of the following 4-bit function
S













with f(y1, y2, y3, y4) = y1y2.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
S(x) f e b c 6 d 7 8 0 3 9 a 4 2 1 5
S1(x) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
S2(x) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
S3(x) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
S4(x) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
degS1S2 ≤ 3
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Exercise: find the maximal degree of the following 4-bit function
S













with f(y1, y2, y3, y4) = y1y2y3.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
S(x) f e b c 6 d 7 8 0 3 9 a 4 2 1 5
S1(x) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
S2(x) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
S3(x) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
S4(x) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
degS1S2S3 ≤ 3
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Product of some coordinates of a permutation
δk = maximal degree of the product of k coordinates of S
In our example:
k 1 2 3 4
δk 3 3 3 4
Proposition. If S is a permutation of Fn2 ,
δk = n if and only if k = n
15
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L
where the 4-bit Sbox S is such that the maximal degree δk of the
product of k of its coordinates is given by
k 1 2 3 4
δk 3 3 3 4
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Exercise: find the maximal degree of the following 2-round cipher
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? ? ? ?
First case:
f(x1, . . . , x8) = y1y2y3 = S1(x1, . . . , x4)S2(x1, . . . , x4)S3(x1, . . . , x4)
⇒ deg f ≤ 3
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Exercise: find the maximal degree of the following 2-round cipher





? ? ? ?
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Second case:
f(x1, . . . , x8) = y1y2y5 = S1(x1, . . . , x4)S2(x1, . . . , x4)S1(x5, . . . , x8)
⇒ deg f ≤ 3 + 3 = 6
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Degree of the product f of d output coordinates
A fundamental parameter:
δk = maximal degree of the product of k coordinates of S
Example: d = 11
???? ???? ???? ????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
S S S S S
deg f ≤ 2δ4 + δ3
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Degree of the product f of d output coordinates
A fundamental parameter:
δk = maximal degree of the product of k coordinates of S
Example: d = 11
???? ???? ???? ????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
S S S S S
deg f ≤ δ4 + 2δ3 + δ1
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Degree of the product f of d output coordinates
A fundamental parameter:
δk = maximal degree of the product of k coordinates of S
Example: d = 11
???? ???? ???? ????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
S S S S S
deg f ≤ max
(x1,...,x4)
(x1δ1 + . . .+ x4δ4)
with x1 + 2x2 + 3x3 + 4x4 = d .
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A new bound [Boura, C., De Cannière 09]
Theorem. Let F = (S, . . . , S) where S is a permutation of Fm2 .
Then,

















k 1 2 3 4




















How does the degree increase with the number of rounds?
Inspired by JH [Wu 2007]
block size = 64 bits with a 4-bit Sbox
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How does the degree increase with the number of rounds?
SuperBox view:
r rounds without the last linear layer = each output depends on 2r+1
input bits.
For r = 3:
n = 16, γ(S) = 3, degG ≤ 6













How does the degree increase with the number of rounds?
SuperBox view:
r rounds without the last linear layer = each output depends on 2r+1
input bits.
For r = 3:
n = 16, γ(S) = 3, degG ≤ 6













Key recovery on 6 rounds





Gk(x) = 0 for any (a+ V ) with dimV = 52
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Key recovery on 6 rounds
Input: 252 pc pairs (mi, ci) with mi in an affine subspace of dim 52
For recovering the j-th key byte kj:
For each possible value for kj
For i from 0 to (252 − 1)
yi,j ←R−1(ci,j ⊕ kj)
If
⊕
i yi,j = 0
Return kj
D = 252 and T = 8× 260
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Are there better choices for V ?
For V = a+ 〈e0, . . . , e27〉,
V = C C C C C C C C C A A A A A A A
• invariant under the key addition and the first Sbox layer
• Let Hk = first linear layer + rounds 2 to 5.





Gk(x) = DVGk(b) = 0
⇒ D = 228 and T = 8× 236
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Gk(x) = 0 for all a ∈ Fn2
means that the ANF of Gk does not contain any monomial multiple
of x0 . . . x27




• zero-sum distinguishers on SHA-3 [Boura, C., De Cannière 11]
• interpolation attack on Low-MC [Dinur, Liu, Meier, Wang 15]
• attack on the full Misty-1 using the division property [Todo 15]
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